Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 00605 01 OF 02 182247Z

71
ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AF-06 ARA-06 EA-07 EUR-12 NEA-10

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

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AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USLO PEKING
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 0605

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, UR
SUBJECT: 30 TH UNGA- THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE

1. SUMMARY: AS IN RECENT UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA) SESSIONS, USSR AGAIN TOOK DETENTE AS ITS MAJOR THEME IN 30TH UNGA. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, SOVIETS STRESSED BOTH
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PAGE 02 USUN N 00605 01 OF 02 182247Z

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DETENTE, PUTTING EMPHASIS ON CONFERENCE ON

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS WERE CONSISTENTLY AT ODDS WITH US ON MANY MAJOR ISSUES. EXCHANGES BETWEEN CHINESE AND SOVIETS REMAINED ACRIMONIOUS. PREDICTABLY, TOO, SOVIETS SOUGHT TO CARRY ON AS "CHAMPIONS" OF AFRICAN AND ARAB CAUSES. END SUMMARY.

2. AS AT 28TH AND 29TH UNGA'S DETENTE WAS AGAIN THE MAJOR SOVIET THEME AT 30TH UNGA. IN 1975, HOWEVER, SOVIETS FOCUSED ON SUPPLEMENTING "POLITICAL DETENTE" WITH "MILITARY DETENTE," PUTTING A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS ON CSCE AND DISARMAMENT. FOCUS ON DISARMAMENT NOT ONLY WAS CLEAR IN GENERAL DEBATE STATEMENTS BUT WAS APPARENT DURING SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF UNGA WHERE SOVIETS LINKED NEED FOR DISARMAMENT WITH PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT.

3. WHILE MAINTAINING A POSTURE OF DETENTE AND COOPERATION WITH THE US, PARTICULARLY ON AN ITEM SUCH AS CHARTER REVIEW, USSR ORCHESTRATED MORE DETAILED AND SPECIFIC ATTACKS ON OTHER US POSITIONS THROUGH ITS ALLIES, MOST NOTICEABLY CUBA. THIS METHOD OF ATTACK VIA PROXY WAS DONE LARGELY IN THIRD COMMITTEE AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO THE NOTABLE US INITIATIVE FOR A GENERAL AMNESTY RESOLUTION FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS. WHILE SOVIETS AND THEIR WARSAW PACT ALLIES ATTACKED US VEHEMENTLY ON KOREA IN FIRST COMMITTEE, SOVIET STATEMENTS IN FIRST AND SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEES OFTEN WERE REPLETE WITH COMPLIMENTARY REMARKS ABOUT FRUITS OF DETENTE.

4. KEEPING SUBJECT OF DETENTE VERY MUCH ALIVE THROUGHOUT SESSION, AS THEY DID WITH US IN BILATERAL PRE-UNGA DISCUSSIONS LAST SUMMER, SOVIETS ALLUDED TO POLICY IN GREAT DETAIL IN BOTH GENERAL DEBATE STATEMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, DURING 30TH UNGA, SOVIETS WERE CONSISTENTLY AT ODDS WITH US ON MOST MAJOR ISSUES, FROM VIETNAMESE UN MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS TO DECOLONIZATION. THEN TOO SOVIET AMBASSADOR MALIK MADE SEVERAL PERSONAL ATTACKS ON AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN, CULMINATING WITH MALIK'S UNPRECENDENTED WALK-OUT PRIOR TO MOYNIHAN'S TRADITIONAL HOST GOVERNMENT SPEECH AT CLOSE OF GA SESSION. MALIK CHARACTERIZED SPEECH AS "AN UNFRIENDLY ACT.".

5. DISARMAMENT. AT 30TH UNGA SOVIETS INTRODUCED TWO RATHER CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 USUN N 00605 01 OF 02 182247Z

THAN ONE"SHOWCASE" INITIATIVE: 1) A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY RESOLUTION (CTB), AND 2) A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR PROHIBITION OF NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS (MDW). SOVIETS ONLY WENT THROUGH MOTIONS OF PRESSING FOR SUPPORT ON CTB INITIATIVE, BUT TOOK PRO-FORMA ACTION FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF RESOLUTION, TO SET UP COMMITTEE ON NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN CTB NEGOTIATIONS. ON MDW INITIATIVE, SOVIETS MOUNTED A MAJOR HING-LEVEL, LOBBYING EFFORT

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ISSRAELYAN PRESSING MATTER
REPEATEDLY WITH US AND EC-9. IN THIS INSTANCE SOVIETS
ADDRESSED EC-9 AS UNIT ON POLITICAL ISSUES FOR FIRST TIME.

6. NEITHER CTB NOR MDW INITIATIVE FARED PARTICULARLY WELL BY UN
STANDARDS. ON CTB INITIATIVE, IN ADDITION TO EXPECTED CHINESE
AND ALBANIAN VOTES AGAINST RESOLUTION, 34 NATIONS ABSTAINED,
INCLUDING U.S. MANY EUROPEANS, AS WELL AS AFRICAN AND ASIAN
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. SOVIETS DID SOMEWHAT BETTER ON MDW
INITIATIVE WITH ONLY ALGANIA VOTING AGAINST RESOLUTION (CHINA
DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN VOTE) AND 15 NATIONS ABSTAINING, INCLUDING
US, UK, AND FRANCE. THE GENERAL REACTION OF MANY THIRD
WORLD NATIONS TO SOVIET
DISARMAMENT MOVES WAS ONE OF INCREASING SKEPTICISM, ALTHOUGH
SOME DELEGATIONS COMMENTED THAT ONE OF THE SUPERPOWERS HAD AT
LEAST TAKEN AN INITIATIVE ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN-AN
OBJECTIVE SHARED BY MANY DELEGATIONS. NET RESULT WAS FAVORABLE
TO SOVIET IMAGE.

7. THE REQUIREMENT IN THE CTB RESOLUTION THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE
ENTERED INTO BY ALL FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PRIOR TO MARCH 31,
1976 WAS PERCEIVED BY MANY DELEGATIONS AS VERY UNREALISTIC IN
LIGHT OF WELL-KNOWN CHINESE ATTITUDES ON THE SUBJECT.

8. OF THE 25 DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS, US AND SOVIET VOTING
POSITION COINCIDED ON 20 RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING RESOLUTION
ON ROLE OF UN IN DISARMAMENT ON WHICH THE SOVIETS VOTED AGAINST
BUT LATER ANNOUNCED THEY HAD INTENDED TO ABSTAIN. IN ADDITION
TO US ABSTENTIONS ON THE TWO SOVIET INITIATIVES DISCUSSED ABOUT
THE US-SOVIET VOTING ALSO DIFFERED ON RESOLUTIONS REGARDING:
1) DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE,
2) PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, 3) AND STRENGTHENING
OF UN DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS DIVISION. HOWEVER, ON SOME DISARMAMENT
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ISSUES OF GENUINE MUTUAL INTEREST SUCH AS RESOLUTION ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL MODIFICATION, SOVIET-US COOPERATION WAS QUITE GOOD.

9. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. POLEMICS BETWEEN USSR AND PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) CONTINUED UNABATED. ALTHOUGH THE
QUANTITY OF CHINESE ATTACKS ON THE "SUPERPOWERS" CLOSELY
PARALLELED THOSE DURING THE 29TH UNGA, THE CHINESE AT THE 30TH
UNGA SEEMED TO BE BEGINNING TO DEVOTE MORE TIME AND RHETORIC TO
THEIR SOVIET NEIGHBOR THAN TO US. HEIGHT OF THIS DISPUTE
WAS LUSTY AND SOMETIMES SHRILL CHINESE OPPOSITION TO
SOVIET-PROPOSED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, WHICH CHINESE
CHARACTERIZED AS "SUPERPOWER HEGEMONY" AGAINST THIRD WORLD
NATIONS, AND TO ANGOLA SITUATION WHERE CHINESE HAMMERED
AWAY AT SOVIET AGGRESSION AND INTERVENTION. ON BOTH THESE
ISSUES, CHINESE, IN ADDITION TO ATTACKING SOVIET POLICIES

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

IN DEBATE, CONDUCTED STRONG CORRIDOR CAMPAIGNS AS WELL.
10. EVEN IN MATTERS WHERE THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE WERE IN AGREEMENT,

SUCH AS KOREA AND ADMISSION OF TWO VIETNAMS, THERE SEEMED
LITTLE EVIDENCE OF COLABORATION.

11. THE SOVIETS, IN RIGHTS OF REPLY, RIDICULED THE CHINESE,
SMUGLY ASSERTING THAT THEY PLUS THIRD WORLD IN GENERAL
WERE THOROUGHLY BORED WITH CHINESE RHETORIC.

12. DURING PERIOD OF 30TH UNGA, SOVIET-CHINESE
FEUD DEGENERATED TO POINT WHERE AMBASSADOR HUANG HUA KEPT
SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WAITING FORTY-FIVE MINUTES BEFORE
APPEARING FOR CONSULTATIONS ON FIRST DAY THAT USSR
PRESIDED OVER COUNCIL IN NOVEMBER. ALTHOUGH THESE POLEMICS
CAN BE AMUSING AND CAN ENLIVEN OFTEN WEARY DEBATES, MOST
DELEGATIONS ARE TIRING OF THE WHOLE MATTER AND NEITHER
CHINESE NOR SOVIETS ARE SCORING POINTS WITH THEIR TIRADES.

13. SOVIET-NON-ALIGNED RELATIONS. THE USSR AGAIN STROVE TO BE
"CHAMPION" OF NON-ALIGNED CAUSES. IT GAVE TOTAL SUPPORT TO
DECOLONIZATION AND APARTHEID RESOLUTIONS. MAJOR PROBLEMS CAME
WHERE THE AFRICANS THEMSELVES WERE DIVIDED OVER ISSUES SUCH AS
SPANISH SAHARA AND ZIONISM. COMING DOWN REGULARLY ON
RADICAL SIDE OF LEDGER, SOVIETS COULD NOT PLEASE ALL.
FURTHERMORE, ANGOLA BROUGHT INTO OPEN AFRICAN FEARS ABOUT
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PAGE 05 USUN N 00605 01 OF 02 182247Z

SOVIET COLONIZATION. SOVIET EFFORTS TO CHAMPION DECOLONIZATION
AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TO RECOLONIZE ANGOLA UNDER AFRICAN NOSES
HAVE FORCED SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO REASSESS THEIR POSTURE
VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, SOVIETS ARE WELL
AHEAD AND CLEARLY ON EXPANSIONIST COURSE.

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PAGE 01 USUN N 00605 02 OF 02 182305Z

71
ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AF-06 ARA-06 EA-07 EUR-12 NEA-10

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5904
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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
/AMEMBASSY RABAT 941
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USLO PEKING
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 0605

14. UNLIKE CHINA, WHICH AVOIDS TAKING POSITIONS ON AFRICAN QUESTIONS ON WHICH AFRICAN STATES THEMSELVES ARE DIVIDED, USSR AT UN FEELS CONSTRAINED TO HAVE FIRM POSITION ON VIRTUALLY EVERY AFRICAN ISSUE. SOVIET STRATEGY HERE OBVIOUSLY IS CONSISTENT WITH MOSCOW'S ACTIVITIES ON AFRICAN CONTINENT, WHICH ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTIVE OF "PROGRESSIVE" ELEMENTS, AND WHICH HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE, AIMED, INTER ALIA, AT SECURING
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CONTROL OVER INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH ATLANTIC SEA LANES. SOVIET OFFICIALS DEALING WITH AFRICA HERE ARE SOMEWHAT RETIRING, HOWEVER. PART OF REASON IS DUE TO STAFFING PROBLEMS. SOVIET AFRICAN - WATCHERS IN NEW YORK ARE NOT PARTICULARLY OUTGOING. THE PRIMARILY FEATHER NESTS OF THOSE WHOM THEY KNOW TO BE THEIR CLIENTS, E.G., GUINEA, SOMALIA, ET AL. AT LEAST PUBLICLY, THEIR COURTING OF NATIONS SUCH AS NIGERIA, WITH WHOM SOVIETS HOPE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, IS NOT APPARENT. MUCH OF SOVIET SOCIALIZING AND

NEGOTIATING WITH AFRICANS IN NEW YORK IS DONE BY SURROGATES FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND, AS IN ANGOLA, CUBA.

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006

15. BY VIRTUE OF THEIR DESIRE TO TAKE FIRM
POSITION ON AFRICAN AND OTHER COLONIAL ISSUES, SOVIET
PERFORMANCE AT 30TH UNGA WAS NOT WITHOUT ITS PROBLEMS. USSR
TOOK STANDARD "ANTI-COLONIALIST" POSITIONS ON BELIZE, DJIBOUTI, AND
OTHER TERRITORIES, BUT WAS GENUINELY IN AQUANDARY OVER SPANISH
SAHARA. IN WORDS OF ONE SOVIET MISSION OFFICER, SUPPORTING
ALGERIAN POSITION WAS TO DEFEND UNGA RESOLUTION 1514," A
KHRUSHCHEV INITIATIVE" "WHILE SUPPORTING MOROCCAN RESOLUTION
WAS TO BACK, IN A WAY, "BREZHNEV DOCTRINE." MOSCOW
WISHED GOOD RELATIONS WITH RABAT WHILE GUARDING FRIENDLY
TIES WITH ALGIERS. NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN ALGERIAN PRESSURES,
RELATED TO SOVIET AIRCRAT REFUELING THERE ENROUTE TO ANGOLA,
SOVIETS CHANGED THEIR VOTE ON MOROCCAN-INSPIRED RESOLUTION FROM AN
ABSTENTION IN COMMITTEE TO A "NO" IN PLENARY.

16 THE SOVIETS, BOLSTERED BY WARSAW PACT MEMBERS HAVE BEEN UNABASHED

IN DEFENDING THEIR ROLE AND THAT OF CUBA, IN ANGOLA,
BY CLAIMING TO BE SUPPORTING ANGOLA'S "LEGITIMATE" GOVERNMENT.
THIS IS NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CAUSING IRRITATION TO MANY
AFRICANS. BUT, AS WITH THEIR INTERVENTIONS IN HUNGARY
AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THAT IRRITATION MAY BE CONSIDERED NEGLIGIBLE
BY SOVIET POLICY MAKERS COMPARED TO VALUE OF PRIZE THEY SEEK
IN ANGOLA.

17. THE SOVIETS HAD LESS DIFFICULTIES IN VOTING RIGHT DOWN
THE LINE WITH THE ARABS ON ZIONISM AND MIDDLE EAST ISSUES.
18. ECONOMIC MATTERS.
SOVIET UNION AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN
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SOVIEALIST STATES ARE PERIPHERAL TO CENTRAL UN DEBATES
ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. THIS IS CASE, SINCE EASTERN
EUROPEANS DO NOT BELONG TO OR DO NOT TAKE ACTIVE PART IN
A LARGE NUMBER OF MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
WHICH PLAY IMPORTANT ROLES IN NORTH"SOUTH DIALOGUE.
FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET UNION IS NOT A MEMBER OF GATT NOR
OF IMF, AND AS CONSEQUENCE ITS PARTICIPATION IN DEBATES ON TRADE
AND MONETARY QUESTIONS IN UNTTED NATIONS
CONTEXT ARE DISTINCTLY MARGINAL TO CONCERNS OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES. ALSO, FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF SOVIET UNION TO
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT FUNDS ARE NOT ONLY SMALL BUT
ARE MADE IN NON-CONVERTIBLE CURRENCIES. RECENTLY COMPLETED
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME GOVERNING COUNCIL SESSION,
MAIN FOCUS OF WHICH WAS A CASH FLOW PROBLEM AFFECTING TECHINCAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, IS GOOD EXAMPLE
OF PROBLEMS CREATED, IN PART, BY SOVIET UNION'S
POLICY OF PARSIMONIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS TO MULTILATERAL AGENCIES.

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19. UPSHOT OF THIS SITUATION IS THAT ISSUES OF OVER-RIDING INTEREST IN NORTH/SOUTH DEBATE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES AT UNITED NATIONS IS ONE WHICH TAKES PLACE BETWEEN LDC'S AND THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES WITH SOVIET UNION MERELY STANDING BY, OCCASIONALLY INTERVENING TO MAKE A PROPAGANDA POINT. PERIPHERAL ROLE OF THE EASTERN EUROPEANS WAS AT NO TIME MORE NOTABLE THEN AT SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION. SOCIALIST COUNTRIES UNDER-TOOK NO INITIATIVES, RELYING EXCLUSIVELY ON RHETORIC OF SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION AND CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES. NONE OF SOCIALISTS WAS INCLUDED IN ANY OF KEY NEGOTIATING GROUPS. THEIR PARTICIPA-TION IN ENTIRE SESSION WAS LIMITED TO A FEW LAST-MINUTE POTSHOTS AT THE DOCUMENT NEGOTIATED BETWEEN LDC'S AND KEY MEMBERS OF WESTERN COMMUNITY.

20. SOVIETS, HOWEVER, BENEFIT BY COINCIDENCE OF THEIR ECONOMIC VIEWS AND THOSE OF ALMOST ALL OF MOST ACTIVE AND VOCAL OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. LATTER ALSO FAVOR LARGE ECONOMIC ROLE FOR STATE. UNFORTUNATELY, LDC'S FAVORING MARKET ECONOMY TEND TO HANG BACK AND TO GO ALONG WITH LEADERS OF G-77. CONSEQUENTLY, RHETORIC OF THIRD WORLD AND USSR ARE USUALLY MUTUALLY SUPPORTING.
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21. SOVIET/CHINESE RIVALRY EXTENDS TO ECONOMIC FORUMS. WHILE TWO VIE WITH ONE ANOTHER IN CURRYING FAVOR WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PRINCIPALLY BY SUPPORTING LDC DEMANDS ON DEVELOPED WORLD, CHINESE AND SOVIETS DISAGREE AC-RIMONIOUSLY ON SEVERAL POINTS. CHINESE LUMP SOVIETS TOGETHER WITH ALL DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AS "IMPERIALSIST EXPLOITERS, " WHILE SOVIETS DISAVOW ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLIGHT OF LDC'S. CHINESE CHARGE THE SOVIETS WITH BEING HEGEMONISTS.

CHINESE ALSO OPPOSE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR 10 PER CENT REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS OF PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL (ROB) AND ITS LINK WITH AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT.
CHINESE POSITION ON THESE QUESTIONS IS STATED FREQUENTLY, AND SOVIETS APPEAR UNABLE TO RESIST RESPONDING TO OR BAITING CHINESE.
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EO Systematic Review
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